This is some information that I am in the process of analyzing in order to draw a more detailed picture of the man made and natural causes of the nuclear meltdown. I would like to share it, since this information has been mentioned but not frequently examined in the media.

1967: Changing the layout of the emergency-cooling system, without reporting it
On 27 February 2012 NISA ordered TEPCO to report by 12 March 2012 about the reasoning to change the layout for the piping for an emergency cooling system from the plans originally registered in 1966 before the reactor was taken in operation.
After the plant was hit by the tsunami, the isolation condenser should have taken over the function of the ordinary cooling pumps, by condensing the steam from the pressure vessel into water to to be used for cooling the reactor. But the condenser did not function properly, and TEPCO could not confirm whether a valve was opened.
In the original papers submitted – in July 1966 – for government approval of the plans to set up the reactor, the piping systems for two units in the isolation condenser were separated from each other. But in the application for the construction plan of the reactor – submitted in October 1967 – the piping layout was changed by TEPCO, and the two piping systems were connected outside the reactor. The changes were not reported in violation of all legal regulations. [44]
1976: Falsification of safety records by TEPCO
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex was central to a falsified-records scandal that led to the departure of a number of senior executives of TEPCO. It also led to disclosures of previously unreported problems at the plant,[45] although testimony by Dale Bridenbaugh, a lead GE designer, purports that General Electric was warned of major design flaws in 1976, resulting in the resignations of several designers who protested GE’s negligence.[46][47][48]
In 2002, TEPCO admitted it had falsified safety records at the No. 1 reactor at Fukushima Daiichi. As a result of the scandal and a fuel leak at Fukushima, the company had to shut down all of its 17 nuclear reactors to take responsibility.[49] A power board distributing electricity to a reactor’s temperature control valves was not examined for 11 years. Inspections did not cover devices related to cooling systems, such as water pump motors and diesel generators.[50]
1991: Back-up generator of reactor nr. 1 flooded
On 30 October 1991 one of two backup generators of reactor nr. 1 did fail, after it was flooded in the basement of the reactor buildings. Seawater used for the cooling of the reactor was leaking into the turbine-building from a corroded pipe at a rate of 20 cubic meters per hour. This was told by former TEPCO employees to the Japan Broadcasting Corporation news-service in December 2011. An engineer told, that he informed his superiors about this accident, and that he mentioned the possibility that a tsunami could inflict damage to the generators in the turbine-buildings near the sea. After this TEPCO did not move the generators to higher grounds, but instead TEPCO installed doors to prevent water leaking into the generator rooms. The Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission commented that it would revise the safety guidelines for designing nuclear plants and would enforce the installation of additional power sources. On 29 December 2011 TEPCO admitted all these facts: its report mentioned, that the emergency power system room was flooded through a door and some holes for cables, but the power supply to the reactor was not cut off by the flooding, and the reactor was stopped for one day. One of the two power sources was completely submerged, but its drive mechanism had remained unaffected.[51][52][53]
2006: The Japanese government opposes a court-order
In March 2006 the Japanese government opposed a court order to close a nuclear plant in the west part of the country over doubts about its ability to withstand an earthquake. Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency believed it was “safe” and that “all safety analyses were appropriately conducted”.[54]
2007: Tsunami-study ignored
In 2007 TEPCO did set up a department to supervise all its nuclear facilities, and until June 2011 its chairman was Masao Yoshida, the chief of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. An in-house study in 2008 pointed out that there was an immediate need to improve the protection of the power station from flooding by seawater. This study mentioned the possibility of tsunami-waves up to 10.2 meters. Officials of the department at the company’s headquarters insisted however that such a risk was unrealistic and did not take the prediction seriously.[55]
2008: Seismic-concerns
In addition to concerns from within Japan, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also expressed concern about the ability of Japan’s nuclear plants to withstand seismic activity. At a meeting of the G8′s Nuclear Safety and Security Group, held in Tokyo in 2008, an IAEA expert warned that a strong earthquake with a magnitude above 7.0 could pose a “serious problem” for Japan’s nuclear power stations.[56]
2011: Results of Governmental Investigations
On request of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, on 2 October 2011 the Japanese Government released a report of TEPCO to NISA. These papers proved that TEPCO was well aware of the possibility that the plant could be hit by a tsunami with waves far higher than the 5.7 meters which the plant was designed to withstand. Simulations done in 2008, based on the destruction caused by the 1896-earthquake in this area, made it clear that waves between 8.4 and 10.2 meters could overflow the plant. Three years later the report was sent to NISA, where it arrived on the 7 March 2011, just 4 days before the plant was hit by the tsunami. Further studies by scientists and an examination of the plant’s tsunami resistance measures were not planned by TEPCO before April 2011, and no further actions were planned to deal with this subject before October 2012. TEPCO official Junichi Matsumoto said that the company did not feel the need to take prompt action on the estimates, which were still tentative calculations in the research stage. An official of NISA said that these results should have been made public by TEPCO, and that the firm should have taken measures right away.[57][58]
This all was in sharp contrast with the events at the Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant where the dike around the plant was raised to 6.1 meters after evaluations showed the possibility of tsunami-waves higher than previously expected. Although the dike was not completely finished at 11 March 2011, the plant could ride out the tsunami, even though the external power-sources in Tokai were lost too. With two (of three) functioning sea-water-pumps and the emergency diesel-generator the reactor could be kept safely in cold shutdown.[59]
On 26 November a TEPCO spokesman mentioned that TEPCO would have been better prepared to cope with the tsunami in March 2011, if it had taken the 2008-study more seriously. TEPCO was also willing to use the estimates of renewed study done by a national civil engineering society for its facility management.[55]
Nuclear Safety Commission Chairman Haruki Madarame told a parliamentary inquiry in February 2012 that “Japan’s atomic safety rules are inferior to global standards and left the country unprepared for the Fukushima nuclear disaster last March”. There were flaws in, and lax enforcement of, the safety rules governing Japanese nuclear power companies, and this included insufficient protection against tsunamis.[60]

I was particularly captivated by the shorts that focused on the impact of media – and even social media – on the dissemination of information about the earthquake. After a natural disaster such as an earthquake, many information networks are severed, and there is a need for updates and news on a national scale as well as a personal one. The irony in the situation lies in the accelerated rate of productivity in media as a direct response to a natural disaster that is often portrayed as a purely destructive force. New interpersonal connections are made through networks of information, and new avenues of expression are discovered by those individuals who take on the task of setting up video feeds, updating Twitter, and providing anticipated news.

As I was reading through the various anecdotes, I was reminded of a documentary I saw, Kobe Shinbun no Nanokakan (The Seven Days of the Kobe Daily Newspaper), that follows the work of photojournalist Tomohiko Mitsuyama in the wake of the Kobe Earthquake in 1995. At the time, I appreciated the unconventional recognition of news crews as heroes, for they worked to deliver not only news, but hope. While disaster relief teams are able to provide direct physical aid, news crews analogically provide indirect, emotional and psychological support. To those who are slightly removed from the actual disaster, the feeling of uncertainty regarding loved ones’ whereabouts deserves to be addressed just as much as the physical needs of those affected by the disaster.

Another aspect that caught my interest is the differences in perception and portrayal that lay between the information provided by ordinary citizens and townfolk and that provided by the government and official organizations. The discrepancies raise the following questions: Which of the two is most useful to those affected by disaster? And how can those on the receiving end qualify the accounts and information? The interplay of objectivity and subjectivity also become a pertinent issue. Of course, objective material is appreciated, but the lack of empathy in such objectivity may come off as harsh to the victims and their families. Alternatively, subjective accounts may become unrelatable and the severe bias creates the potential for insertion of ulterior motive.

246: Aftershocks – Stories from the Japan Earthquake itself is a demonstration of the impact of this personalized storytelling and web of information. Its subjectivity is checked by the variety of accounts provided by its contributors, while maintaining the poetry of humanity and personal experience found in each speaker’s words.

Reference: Alive (pg. 12), Bravery (15), Changed (19), Conversation (20)

I find the models of spectators that Boltanski describes, very apt for understanding the various characters we assume as we contemplate the tragedies of others. What I don’t yet understand is how these characters are related to particular contexts and circumstances. It seems that there are different versions of the ideal spectator according to the norms of different cultures, some of which have elaborate rituals of ethical posturing, and other which are more straightforward. This seems to be very similar with other traditions of etiquette. In certain subcultures that I have encountered, the expectation of what character to embody is different, for example I might be expected to vocalize concern to a group of my Grandmother’s friends, whereas with my own peers, silence is a better way of communicating sympathy.

I appreciate Boltanski’s characterization of the necessity of a clearly established point of view in any representation of the event, neutrality being akin to cruel disregard. I wonder what it would be like if other spheres of conversation had the same sort of prohibition on description with a seeming lack of point of view. This is particularly true when it comes to the human body. And I would offer the addition point that the reason for this repulsion towards a realism when it comes to the human body is about our sensitivity to the recognition of individual people. Often disasters are spoken about from the perspective of vast groups. Because the significance of these events is correlated to the number of people who are affected by the disaster, the individual is often the last relevant topic, instead, articles concern millions of dollars worth of damage or number of casualties.

Another question this raised for me is whether the balancing of forces, of description vs. personal sentiment or indignation vs. tenderheartedness, might be put out of balance by changes in the distance between tragedy and spectator due to evolving media and technology. I assume that Boltanski is talking about a scenario with internet and telephone, that facilitates the distance of knowledge. Where things considerably different before faster communication over distances? Now that more intensive means of intervention through networking are possible, does this change the obligations of the good samaritan?

In trying to figure out the relationship between human need for energy and natural disaster, there are many different conceptions of the relevant narrative. I searched the words “energy” and “natural disaster” to try to get an idea of the most prevalent narratives. Last week I found myself advocating the causal story as “the need for energy begets natural disaster” (in light of our need to construct energy creating structures that are then succeptible to natural cycles) or “the coincidence of human construction and natural geologic and meterologic cycles leads to human disaster”. This conception is not very similar to the popular narative. Here are the summarized theses of the top 7 google stories for this search:

Natural disaster endangers energy systems

Energy systems are not a luxury

Tsunamis are not related to climate change

Renewable energy may endanger the enviroment
i.e. japan

Japan endangers hopes for renewable energy

We need to research natural disaster for the sake of scientific understanding of climate change and and consider the implications for national security.